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1 Scope of this submission 
The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse is required to 
inquire  into,  amongst  other  things,  ‘what institutions and governments should do to 
address, or alleviate the impact of, past and future child sexual abuse in institutional 
contexts, including in ensuring justice for victims through the provision of redress by 
institutions’.1  
1.1 Limitation of Actions statutes – limitation periods 
 
To assist the Royal Commission in addressing the terms of the Letters Patent, this 
submission responds to specific matters of interest to the Royal Commission, namely: 
 
(1) Are there elements of the civil litigation systems, as they currently operate, 
which raise issues for the conduct of litigation brought by people who 
suffer child sexual abuse in institutional contexts?  For example: 
(e)  limitation periods which restrict the time within which a victim may 
sue and the circumstances in which limitation periods may be 
extended; 
(4)        What changes should be made to address the elements of the civil 
litigation systems that raise issues for the conduct of litigation brought by 
people who suffer child sexual abuse in institutional contexts?   
 
1.2 The central recommendation of this submission: abolition of time 
limits for civil claims regarding child sexual abuse 
 
This submission makes one simple yet powerful recommendation. It is informed by 
extensive analyses of: the phenomenon of child sexual abuse and its psychological 
sequelae; of legislative time limits and case law across Australia and internationally; of 
the policy reasons underpinning statutory time limits generally; and of the need for 
fairness, certainty and practicability in the legal system. 
 
The recommendation is: 
 
In line with jurisdictions in Canada, legislative reform is required in all 
Australian States and Territories to remove time limitations for civil claims for 
injuries caused by child sexual abuse. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Letters Patent for the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, S No 12 of 
2013, 11 January 2013, Term of Reference (d). 
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1.3 Submission based on scholarly articles 
 
As an Associate Professor in the School of Law at Queensland University of 
Technology, and having conducted extensive research in this field, the 
recommendation and points made in this submission are informed by scholarly work I 
have published in five articles, other work completed in the course of consulting with 
institutions in this context, and recent developments in Australia and overseas.   
 
The articles and key consultation pieces are:2 
 
    B Mathews,  ‘Limitation  periods  and  child  sexual  abuse  cases:  Law,  psychology,  time  
and justice’  (2003)  11(3)  Torts Law Journal 218-243.   
 
        B  Mathews,  ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury to a child by a parent 
or close associate: new  jurisdictional  gulfs’  (2004)  12(3)  Torts Law Journal 239-258.  
 
        B  Mathews,  ‘Judicial  Considerations  of  Reasonable  Conduct  by  Survivors  of  Child  
Sexual  Abuse’  (2004)  27(3)  University of New South Wales Law Journal 631-666.  
 
        B  Mathews,  ‘Assessing  the  Scope  of  the  Post-Ipp  “Close  Associate”  Special  Limitation  
Period  for  Child  Abuse  Cases’  (2004)  11  James Cook University Law Review 63-83. 
 
        B  Mathews,  ‘Queensland  Government  Actions  to  Compensate  Survivors  of  Institutional 
Abuse:  A  Critical  and  Comparative  Evaluation’  (2004)  4(1)  Queensland University of 
Technology Law & Justice Journal 23-45. 
 
 B Mathews, Concise case for the amendment of Australian State and Territory statutes 
of limitation for cases of child sexual abuse, Research report prepared for The Most 
Reverend Dr Phillip Aspinall, Archbishop of the Diocese of Brisbane, Primate of the 
Anglican Church of Australia, March 2009. 
 
 
These articles are enclosed with the submission and are also available at  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Mathews,_Ben.html
                                                     
2 These articles are enclosed with the submission. 
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2 Executive Summary 
 
 
2.1 Growing recognition of the need for reform of limitation of actions 
legislation for child sexual abuse cases 
 
Limitation of actions statutes set time periods within which a plaintiff must bring their 
legal claim. In Australia, there is a growing recognition of the need to reform these 
statutory time limits to remove unjustifiable obstacles to access to justice for survivors 
of child sexual abuse. It is recognized that current time limits not only differ 
unjustifiably between States and Territories, but that they produce unjust results in 
denying plaintiffs access to courts in the special context of child sexual abuse cases.  
 
A broad consensus from government inquiries, legal organisations, religious 
institutions and academics 
In essence, a broad consensus has emerged that current statutory time limits do not 
allow a reasonable amount of time for victims of child sexual abuse to commence civil 
claims and have access to the justice system to have their claim decided. The result is 
that many victims are denied access to courts to seek damages for their injuries. 
 
The acknowledgment of this, and the growing recognition of the need for reform, is 
exemplified by the conclusions and recommendations made by government inquiries, 
representative legal organisations, representatives of major religious institutions, and 
scholarly work. A selection of these conclusions demonstrates this: 
 
‘There  is  no  public  policy  justification  for  applying  limitation  periods  to  civil  cases  relating  
to  criminal  child  abuse’  …  ‘Because  reporting  in  cases  of  criminal  child  abuse  is  typically  
delayed for several decades, it is necessary to amend the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 
(Vic)  to  allow  victims  of  criminal  child  abuse  sufficient  time  to  initiate  legal  action’ 
 
Parliament of Victoria, Family and Community Development Committee, 
Betrayal of Trust: Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other 
Non-Government Organisations, 2013, Findings 26.7 and 26.8, p 542-543. 
 
‘The  Archbishop  of  Melbourne,  Denis  Hart…said  all  states  and  territories  should  abolish  
time limits on victims seeking compensation in civil  proceedings…“There  shouldn’t  be  
any  artificial  restriction  on  our  society’s  ability  to  redress  such  matters” ’ 
 
Archbishop of Melbourne, Denis Hart, quoted by P  Munro,  ‘Scrap  time  limits  on  child  
sex  abuse  cases,  urges  head  of  bishops’,  Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 2012. 
 
‘Child  sexual  abuse  cases  form  a  special  category  of  intentional  tort,  where  policy  
considerations strongly favour allowing proceedings to continue where there is a 
possibility  of  a  fair  trial’   
 
Law Council of Australia, A Model Limitation Period for Personal Injury Actions in 
Australia, 2011, p 8. 
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[A] more appropriate long-term solution for all Australian legislatures would be to 
abolish the limitation period altogether for sexual assault claims. 
  
Lisa Sarmas, ‘Mixed  messages on sexual assault and the statute of limitations: Stingel v 
Clark,  the  Ipp  “reforms’  and  an  argument  for  change’  (2008) 32 Melbourne University 
Law Review 609, 638 
 
Eleven  of  Canada’s  thirteen  provinces  and territories have amended their limitation of 
action statutes to effectively abolish limitation periods for victims of child sexual abuse.  
 
Dr Ben Mathews,  ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury to a child by a 
parent  or  close  associate:  New  jurisdictional  gulfs’  (2004)  12(3)  Torts Law Journal 239, 
242; updated March 2014. 
 
The time is ripe for this enhancement of justice and social welfare. 
 
Dr Ben Mathews,  ‘Limitation  periods  and  child  sexual  abuse  cases:  Law,  psychology,  
time  and  justice’  (2003)  11(3)  Torts Law Journal 218, 242-3. 
 
 
2.2 Almost all Canadian provinces and territories have abolished time 
limits for child sexual abuse cases 
 
Eleven out of thirteen Canadian jurisdictions have amended their legislation to allow 
child sexual victims a fair period of time in which to bring claims. In nearly all cases, 
this has been achieved by removing the limitation period entirely. This policy change 
has been driven by recognition of the special context of child sexual abuse and its 
qualitative characteristics, and of the traditional policy reasons behind limitation 
periods not applying to this class of cases. The changes have enabled claims to be 
commenced, and  courts’  normal  functions  and  capacities  in  determining  proof  and  fair  
outcomes in all civil claims are naturally preserved to enable fair hearings for 
defendants. The reforms have not  caused  an  intolerable  ‘flood  of  claims’.3 
 
Table 1: Canadian provincial and territorial legislation: limitation periods for civil claims based on 
sexual assault 
 
Province/territory Legislative provision Effect 
Alberta Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12 Limitation period retained 
British Columbia Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13, s 3(1)(k) No limitation period 
Manitoba The Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM c L 150, s 
2.1(2)(a) 
No limitation period 
New Brunswick Limitation of Actions Act, SNB, 2009, c L-8.5, s 14.1 No limitation period 
Newfoundland and Labrador Limitations Act, SNL 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2) No limitation period 
Northwest Territories Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1988, c L-8, s 2.1(2) No limitation period 
Nova Scotia Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5) No limitation period while plaintiff 
unaware of injuries and causal 
connection 
Ontario Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, s 10 No limitation period 
Prince Edward Island Statute of Limitations, RSPEI 1988, c S-7 Limitation period retained 
Quebec Civil Code of Quebec, LRQ, c C-1991, s 2926.1 30 years 
Saskatchewan The Limitation Act, SS 2004, c L-16.1, s 16(1)(a) No limitation period 
Yukon Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 139, s 2(3) No limitation period 
                                                     
3 British Columbia Ministry of Justice, New Limitation Act: Questions and Answers, 2013, 
www.ag.gov.bc.ca 
© Dr Ben Mathews                8 
 
2.3 Fundamental policy reasons and the qualitative features of child 
sexual abuse underpin the calls for reform 
 
The policy reasons underpinning these calls for reform are supported by the distinctive 
qualitative features of child sexual abuse cases, which mark these cases as different 
from ordinary civil disputes.  
These policy reasons for reform are also animated by the fundamental requirement 
that legal processes and institutions in a society governed by the rule of law should 
safeguard the right of access to justice for those who have experienced violent 
breaches of personal bodily and psychological integrity and who have suffered 
substantial personal injuries. In a liberal democratic society, people must not be 
impeded from exercising legal rights. Adjudicative procedures should be fair, means 
must be provided to resolve disputes, and the law must protect fundamental human 
rights.4 
This applies generally to cases of child sexual abuse regardless of the identity of the 
perpetrator. It applies even more strongly when the perpetrator occupies a position of 
psychological, emotional, economic power over the victim, such as in the case of 
abuse by a parent or family member. Arguably, it applies more strongly still where 
such  a  perpetrator’s  acts  have  been  fostered,  protected  or  shielded  within  a  context  of  
institutional  power  and  where  not  only  the  perpetrator’s  position  of  psychological  or  
emotional superiority but that of the institution has acted as a psychosocial 
impediment to the victim being able to seek legal redress. 
 
 
2.4 Limitation of actions statutes: some key principles 
 
Limitation of actions statutes set time periods within which a plaintiff must bring their 
legal claim. In Australia, each State and Territory has constitutional power to make 
laws regarding the conduct of civil litigation for personal injuries, and so each State 
and Territory has enacted its own statute of limitation.  
 
No uniform approach – extreme complexity 
There is no uniform approach across Australia and the laws differ substantially. The 
laws are extremely complex, often being described by superior courts as the worst 
drafted Acts on the statute book. This complexity complicates matters for plaintiffs 
generally, and even more so for those in child sexual abuse claims. It also makes it 
difficult to synthesise even basic propositions. The desirability of simplicity and 
certainty noted by Rehnquist J is of particular cogency in this context. 
 
In Queensland v Stephenson (2006) 227 ALR 17 at 27, Kirby J observed: 
In Ditchburn v Seltsam Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 697 at 698, I suggested that an encounter with 
statutory provisions similar to those under consideration in this appeal was liable to confuse 
                                                     
4 Bingham,  Lord  T,  ‘The  Rule  of  Law’  (2007)  66(1)  Cambridge Law Journal 67-85. 
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judges and lawyers  causing  them  to  emerge  “on the other side dazed, bruised and not entirely 
certain of their whereabouts”. The passage of 17 years, and many more cases struggling with the 
meaning of the statutory language, has not removed the sense of disorientation. In a 
competition involving many worthy candidates, Lord Reid's prize [of it being the worst drafted 
Act on the statute book: Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd [1973] AC 518 at 529] remains in place. 
This is so although, as Rehnquist J noted in Chardon v Fumoro Solo [1983] USSC 131 "[f]ew laws 
stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of 
limitation". This desirable goal has not been attained in Australia...This appeal affords the latest 
illustration of that fact. 
 
Key principles. A full treatment of salient principles is provided in several scholarly 
articles.5 Several key principles can be noted for the purposes of this submission. 
 
(1) Basic limitation period is usually three years after attaining legal majority, with 
time being suspended while a child. In most States and Territories, civil claims for 
damages arising from situations of child sexual abuse must be brought within three 
years of attaining legal majority; hence, normally this means an action must be 
brought by age 21. In these circumstances, the time limitation period is suspended 
while the child is a minor. It is not possible for many survivors of child sexual abuse 
to bring the claim within this time period. A major reason for this is that the nature 
and extent of the injuries may not have fully manifested. In addition, often, the 
plaintiff may not have connected the injuries with the acts of abuse. 
 
(2) In some jurisdictions the time period is not suspended during minority and the 
child’s  parent  is  expected to commence proceedings. In contrast, in New South 
Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, the time limitation period is not suspended while 
the  child  is  a  minor;  a  child’s  parent  is  expected  to  bring  the  action  on  the  child’s  
behalf. This is simply inadequate as many survivors will not have the good fortune 
to have parents who are able and willing to act on their behalf. 
 
(3) Some jurisdictions have more generous limitation period where the wrongdoer is 
a  parent  or  ‘close  associate’  of  a  parent. In several jurisdictions (NSW, Victoria), a 
different,  more  generous  time  period  is  allowed  where  the  defendant  is  the  child’s  
parent,  or  a  ’close  associate  of  the  child’s  parent’.  A major limits is that this only 
applies for injuries suffered after the commencement of these legislative 
amendments. This does provide a more justifiable time period for plaintiffs in 
these  cases.  It  recognizes  that  the  parent  will  be  unlikely  to  proceed  on  the  child’s  
behalf, that the child will be less able to disclose the abuse. However, even for 
these situations it has a limited scope and is inadequate to accommodate the 
features of institutional child sexual abuse. Tasmania and Western Australia have 
provisions  based  on  the  ‘parent/close  associate  of  a  parent’  concept  but the time 
periods are not as generous as those in NSW and Victoria. 
 
                                                     
5 See  especially  L  Sarmas,  ‘Mixed  messages  on  sexual  assault  and  the  statute  of  limitations:  Stingel  v  
Clark,  the  Ipp  “reforms’  and  an  argument  for  change’  (2008)  32  Melbourne University Law Review 
609;  B  Mathews,  ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury to a child by a parent or close 
associate:  new  jurisdictional  gulfs’  (2004)  12(3)  Torts Law Journal 239. See also Law Council of 
Australia, A Model Limitation Period for Personal Injury Actions in Australia, 2011. 
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(4) Extensions of time may be sought but are costly and frequently defeated. Where 
a  plaintiff  is  ‘out  of  time’,  in most but not all jurisdictions a plaintiff may seek an 
extension of time from the court. This is done on the basis that the plaintiff had 
not  ‘discovered’  the  cause  of  action  for  legitimate  reasons,  by  not  knowing  key  
‘discoverability’  facts required to bring the claim (such as the fact of negligence 
occurring; the nature and extent of the injury; the fact the injury was caused by the 
defendant’s  act;  and  of  the  injury  being  sufficiently  serious  to  justify  bringing  an  
action). However, these applications are costly, time-consuming, stressful, and 
often are denied. 
 
(5) The limitation period does not operate automatically; defendant must choose to 
plead it. Importantly, it must be noted that the time limitation period does not 
operate automatically to bar a plaintiff from access to a court. A defendant must 
choose to plead the expiry of time as a defence. This choice has been used as a 
technical matter in many case of deserving claims in child sexual abuse cases. It is a 
principle which is open to abuse by a more powerful defendant - such as a religious 
institution, or a government - over a less powerful plaintiff. 
 
(6) Absolute  ‘longstop’  period. Some jurisdictions have an absolute  ‘longstop’  period, 
after which an action cannot be brought. 
 
(7) Legal disability provisions. In some rare cases, a plaintiff may plead suspension of 
time because of the presence of an ongoing legal disability, most likely based on 
post-traumatic stress disorder, which suspends time from running. However, this is 
a highly technical argument and would require very strong medical evidence of 
continual disability to instruct solicitors and otherwise do the acts necessary to 
bring a claim.  
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3 Fundamental principles and problems: statutes of 
limitation and child sexual abuse cases 
 
Legislation in each Australian State and Territory sets time limits within which civil 
claims for damages must be commenced.6 These limits were created decades ago to 
apply in ordinary personal injury contexts, before child sexual abuse and claims for 
injuries caused by it were recognized by scholarly, community and legal discourse.  
 
In general, as acknowledged below, there are sound public policy reasons for having 
time limits for civil claims. However, due to qualitative differences in the nature, 
context and psychological sequelae of child sexual abuse, clear problems arise in the 
application of these time limits to civil claims for damages arising from child sexual 
abuse, and particularly from institutional child sexual abuse. 
 
Here, four distinctive features of child sexual abuse are analysed to demonstrate why 
traditional approaches to statutory time limits are unjustifiable in these cases. Then, 
overarching  problems  with  Australia’s  time  limitation  statutes  are  noted.  Together  
these analyses indicate that it is time for legislative reform to enable plaintiffs in child 
sexual abuse claims to have fair access to the justice system.  
 
 
3.1 Delayed disclosure  
 
This frequent feature of the child sexual abuse context is arguably the main reason 
justifying a different approach to statutory time limits for this class of case. Due to the 
nature and typical psychological sequelae of child sexual abuse, most significantly 
including post-traumatic stress disorder, victims frequently cannot disclose the abuse 
at all, or can only do so a significant period of time after the time limit has expired. 
This means that no matter what jurisdiction they are in, many victims cannot discuss 
their experience or engage in the required dealings with legal advisors in order to 
bring their claim within time. 
 
Reasons for non-disclosure. A child who has been sexually abused child will often not 
disclose it at all, or will only disclose it many years later.7 Child sexual abuse is usually 
inflicted by an adult who is known to the child, as exemplified by institutional cases.8 
Nondisclosure may be influenced by many factors, including: the child being preverbal 
or very young;9 being persuaded the acts are normal, or feelings of guilt, shame, 
                                                     
6 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT); Limitation Act 1969 (NSW); Limitation Act 1981 (NT); Limitation of Actions 
Act 1974 (Qld); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA); Limitation Act 1974 (Tas); Limitation of Actions 
Act 1958 (Vic); Limitation Act 2005 (WA). 
7  Paine,  M,  and  Hansen,  D,  ‘Factors influencing children to self-disclose sexual abuse’,  (2002)  22 
Clinical Psychology Review, 271-295; Smith, D, Letourneau, E, Saunders, B, et al, ‘Delay In disclosure 
of childhood rape: Results from a national survey’,  (2000)  24  (2) Child Abuse & Neglect, 273-287. 
8  Smallbone,  S,  and  Wortley,  R,  ‘Child  Sexual  Abuse:  Offender  Characteristics  and  Modus  Operandi’  
(2001) 193 Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1-6. 
9  Berliner,  L,  and  Conte,  J,  ‘The  process of victimization: The victims’  perspective’,  (1990)  14 Child 
Abuse & Neglect, 29-40. 
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embarrassment and responsibility;10 fear of reprisals to the child;11 the perpetrator 
being a parent, family member, or other trusted figure,12 including a clergy member;13 
and fear of the perpetrator being punished.14  
 
Time to disclose. Evidence demonstrates the frequent requirement of time for a 
survivor to become able to even report the abuse. In Queensland, the Project Axis 
survey found that of 212 adult survivors, 25 took 5–9 years to disclose it, 33 took 10–
19 years, and 51 took over 20 years. Where the perpetrator is a relative, it is even 
more likely that the delay will be long. A Criminal Justice Commission analysis of 
Queensland Police Service data from 1994–1998 found that of 3721 reported offences 
committed by relatives, 25.5% of survivors took 1–5 years to report the acts; 9.7% 
took 5–10 years; 18.2% took 10–20 years; and 14.2% took more than 20 years.15 
 
 
3.2 Power imbalance 
 
Due to the nature and context of sexual abuse, the individual perpetrator is clothed 
with physical, cognitive, emotional and psychological power over the child. In many 
and probably most cases of institutional abuse, especially those involving perpetrators 
within a religious institution or a government institution, this power dynamic is further 
heightened. 
 
Along with the already invidious effects of sexual abuse which are inherent to the 
factual context, these dual dimensions of power related to the identity and nature of 
the perpetrator and his or her protective institution places the plaintiff in a massively 
imbalanced power relationship. This means it can be even more difficult for the victim 
to disclose the abuse, and bringing civil proceedings against a defendant holding a 
significant economic and sometimes psychological and emotional power imbalance 
further deeply compromises  a  plaintiff’s  capacity to seek access to justice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10  Berliner and Conte, (1990); Ney, P, Moore, C, McPhee, J, and Trought, P, ‘Child  abuse:  A  study  of the 
child’s perspective’,  (1986)  10 Child Abuse & Neglect, 511-518. 
11  Palmer, S, Brown, R, Rae-Grant, N, and Loughlin, M, ‘Responding to children’s  disclosure of familial 
abuse: What survivors tell us’,  (1999)  78 Child Welfare, 259-282. 
12  Arata, C, ‘To  tell  or  not  to  tell:  Current  functioning  of  child  sexual  abuse  survivors  who  disclosed  their  
victimization’,  (1998) 3 Child Maltreatment, 63-71; Kogan, S, ‘Disclosing unwanted sexual 
experiences: results from a national sample of adolescent women’,  (2004) 28 Child Abuse & Neglect, 
147-165. 
13  Parkinson, P, Oates, K, and Jayakody, A,  ‘Breaking  the  long  silence:  Reports  of  child  sexual  abuse  in  
the  Anglican  Church  of  Australia’ (2010) 6 (2) Ecclesiology 183-200. 
14  Mian, M, Wehrspann, W, Klajner-Diamond, H, et al, ‘Review  of  125  children  6  years  of  age  and  under  
who  were  sexually  abused,’  (1986) 10 Child Abuse & Neglect, 223-229. 
15 M  Dunne  and  M  Legosz,  ‘The  consequences  of  childhood  sexual  abuse’  in  QCC  and  QPS,  Project AXIS 
— Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: Selected Research and Papers, 2000, Brisbane, p 80-82, Tables 
23, 25. 
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3.3 Different context of child sexual abuse from ordinary civil disputes 
 
Statutes of limitation are common in numerous legal systems, and in general, they are 
underpinned by sound policy reasons. The core policy value motivating limitation 
periods  is  that  where  there  is  undue  delay,  ‘the  whole  quality  of  justice  deteriorates’.16 
In particular, the quality of available evidence will be lessened by the passage of time, 
whether by faded memory, death, or the absence of witnesses and documentation.  
 
The concern is that the defendant should be able to mount a defence with sufficiently 
fresh evidence to secure a fair trial. As well, it is said that defendants should be able to 
proceed with their lives unencumbered by the threat of late claims; that plaintiffs 
should not sleep on their rights; and that the public interest requires that disputes be 
settled as quickly as possible. 
 
Why the policy reasons are inapplicable to child sexual abuse cases. However, these 
time limits were designed generations ago to accommodate the archetypical legal 
conflict (such as a motor vehicle accident). They were made at a time and in a context 
where the critical features of typical legal disputes were substantially different from 
those characteristic of claims based on child sexual abuse. It is also highly significant 
that the statutory time limits were designed at a time when child sexual abuse and its 
consequences were virtually unknown. Thus, statutory time limits were not designed 
to cater for child sexual abuse claims, with their far different characteristics.  
 
Table 2: Qualitative differences between typical legal conflicts and child sexual abuse cases  
 
Critical feature Model legal conflict Child sexual abuse case 
Status/capacity of injured person Adult Child 
Features of wrongdoer who has 
caused injury 
Injury inflicted by a stranger having 
no cognitive, psychological or 
emotional influence or power over 
the plaintiff 
injury often inflicted by an adult holding 
considerable cognitive, psychological or 
emotional influence or power over 
child, and who may continue to do so  
Are parties on an equal footing Yes No 
Capacity to disclose events 
causing injury 
Yes No 
Whether injuries tend to be 
obvious or latent 
Obvious Latent 
Whether injuries obviously 
related  to  defendant’s  acts 
Yes No 
Whether injuries involve 
reluctance or inability to 
commence legal proceedings 
No Yes 
Whether plaintiff generally able 
to institute legal proceedings 
within a relatively short period of 
time of the event and injury 
Yes No 
Presence of witnesses Yes No 
Does failure to commence 
proceedings suggest plaintiff has 
slept on their rights 
Yes No 
                                                     
16 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, McHugh J at 551; citing R v 
Lawrence [1982] AC 510 at 517. 
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3.4 Post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological injuries 
compromising capacity to commence proceedings within time 
A substantial body of research has identified the effects of child sexual abuse.17 Apart 
from physical injury, psychological injury is frequent and often continues through 
adulthood,18 with consequent effects on behaviour and socialization, and capacity to 
navigate legal processes. Most relevant to the issue of limitation of actions statutes is 
that the psychological consequences commonly include post-traumatic stress 
disorder.19 Post-traumatic stress disorder is a trauma-related disorder recognized in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V.20 PTSD is particularly 
relevant to the issue of whether limitation periods are justifiable in child sexual abuse 
cases because one of its key symptoms inherently compromises a  person’s  capacity  to  
bring a civil claim. This is the avoidance symptom: the person with PTSD persistently 
                                                     
17 Gilbert, R et al,  ‘Burden  and consequences of child maltreatment in high-income  countries’  (2009)  373  
(9657) Lancet 68; Chen, L et al,  ‘Sexual  abuse  and  lifetime  diagnosis  of  psychiatric  disorders:  
systematic review and meta-analysis’  (2010)  85  Mayo Clinic Proceedings 618; Paolucci, E et al,  ‘A  
meta-analysis  of  the  published  research  on  the  effects  of  child  sexual  abuse’  (2001)  135  The Journal 
of Psychology 17;  Putnam,  F,  ‘Ten-year  research  update  review:  Child  sexual  abuse’ (2003) 42 
Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 269-278. 
18 Chen et al, (2010); Gilbert et al, (2009); Spataro, J, Mullen, P, Burgess, P, et al, ‘Impact  of  child  sexual  
abuse  on  mental  health:  Prospective  study  in  males  and  females’,  (2004) 184 British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 416-421; Widom,C, Marmorstein, N, and White, H, ‘Childhood  victimization  and  illicit  
drug  use  in  middle  adulthood’,  (2006) 20 (4) Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 394-403; Cutajar, M, 
Mullen,  P,  Ogloff,  J,  Thomas,  S,  Wells,  D,  and  Spataro,  J,  ‘Psychopathology in a large cohort of 
sexually  abused  children  followed  up  to  43  years’  (2010)  34  Child Abuse & Neglect 813-822. 
19 Boney-McCoy,  S,  and  Finkelhor,  D,  ‘Prior  victimization:  A  risk  factor  for  child  sexual  abuse  and  for  
PTSD-related symptomatology among sexually  abused  youth’,  (1995)  19  Child Abuse & Neglect, 
1401-1421; Dubner,  A,  and  Motta,  R,  ‘Sexually  and  physically  abused  foster  care  children  and  
posttraumatic  stress  disorder’,  (1999)  67  Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 367-373; 
Trowell,  J,  Ugarte,  B,  Kolvin,  I,  et  al  ‘Behavioural  psychopathology  of  child  sexual  abuse  in  schoolgirls  
referred  to  a  tertiary  centre:  A  North  London  study’,  (1999)  8  European Journal of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, 107-116; Susan  McLeer  et  al,  ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually 
Abused  Children’  (1988)  27  Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; 
Esther  Deblinger  et  al,  ‘Post-Traumatic Stress in Sexually Abused, Physically Abused, and Nonabused 
Children’  (1989)  13 Child Abuse and Neglect 403;  Susan  McLeer  et  al,  ‘Sexually  Abused  Children  at  
High Risk for Post-Traumatic  Stress  Disorder’  (1992)  31  Journal of the American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry 875;  Susan  McLeer  et  al,  ‘Psychiatric  Disorders  in  Sexually Abused 
Children’  (1994)  33  Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 313; David 
Wolfe,  Louise  Sas  and  Christine  Wekerle,  ‘Factors  Associated  with  the  Development  of  Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder among Child Victims of Sexual  Abuse’  (1994)  18  Child Abuse and Neglect 
37; Sue Boney-McCoy  and  David  Finkelhor,  ‘Prior  Victimization:  A  Risk  Factor  for  Child  Sexual  Abuse  
and for PTSD-Related  Symptomatology  among  Sexually  Abused  Youth’  (1995)  19  Child Abuse and 
Neglect 1401; Peggy Ackerman  et  al,  ‘Prevalence  of  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Other 
Psychiatric  Diagnoses  in  Three  Groups  of  Abused  Children  (Sexual,  Physical,  and  Both)’  (1998)  22  
Child Abuse and Neglect 759;  Susan  McLeer  et  al,  ‘Psychopathology  in  Non-Clinically Referred 
Sexually  Abused  Children’  (1998)  37  Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry 1326;  Judith  Trowell  et  al,  ‘Behavioural  Psychopathology  of  Child  Sexual  Abuse  in  
Schoolgirls  Referred  to  a  Tertiary  Centre:  A  North  London  Study’  (1999) 8 European Journal of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry 107;  Allison  Dubner  and  Robert  Motta,  ‘Sexually  and  Physically  Abused  
Foster  Care  Children  and  Posttraumatic  Stress  Disorder’  (1999)  67 Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 367. 
20 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition 
(DSM-V). 
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avoids trauma-related stimuli, and has numbed general responsiveness, as shown by 
factors including: avoiding thoughts, feelings or conversations concerned with the 
event; avoiding activities, people or places that recall the event; and an inability to 
remember an important feature of the event. 
Other relevant consequences 
Also  affecting  victims’  capacity  to  engage  with  defendants,  institutions,  legal  systems  
and actors, the effects also commonly include depression and low self-esteem.21 
Consequences affecting general capacity to navigate complex social systems and legal 
processes include suicidal ideation,22 criminal offending,23 alcohol abuse, substance 
abuse and running away from home,24 and associated effects on intellectual, academic 
and personal achievement,25 and adult economic well-being.26 Sexual abuse of greater 
duration and severity (for example, involving penetration) and where the abuser is a 
family member or similarly influential figure, is understood as more likely to occasion 
significant adverse consequences.27  
 
3.5 Different Australian jurisdictions have different legislative time 
periods within which a civil action must be commenced 
 
Across States and Territories, the statutes differ substantially in setting the time 
periods within which a claim must be brought. This situation is not justified as there 
are no jurisdiction-specific reasons for having different approaches. The result is that a 
plaintiff in one jurisdiction may be disadvantaged from a plaintiff in another 
jurisdiction purely because of their geographical location. 
 
Acts of sexual abuse constitute negligence or breach of duty, as well as trespass 
In Australian law, it is well established that the acts of sexual abuse which constitute 
an intentional tort not only constitute acts of trespass, but also constitute negligence 
or breach of duty.28 Because part of the cause of action in negligence requires the 
                                                     
21  Spataro et al, (2004); Swanston, H, Plunkett, A, O’Toole, B, et al, ‘Nine  years  after  child  sexual  abuse’,  
(2003) 27 Child Abuse & Neglect, 967-984. 
22  Molnar, B, et al, ‘Psychopathology,  childhood  sexual  abuse  and  other  childhood  adversities:  Relative  
links  to  subsequent  suicidal  behaviour  in  the  US’,  (2001) 31 Psychological Medicine, 965. 
23  Stewart, A, Livingston, M, and Dennison, S, ‘Transitions and turning points: Examining the links 
between child maltreatment and juvenile offending,’  (2008)  32 Child Abuse & Neglect, 51-66. 
24  Dube  et  al.,  2006;  Simpson,  T,  and  Miller,  R,  ‘Concomitance  between  childhood  sexual  and  physical  
abuse and substance abuse  problems:  A  review’,  (2002) 22 Clinical Psychological Review, 27-77. 
25  Perez, C, and Widom, C, ‘Childhood  victimization  and  long-term intellectual and academic 
outcomes,’ (1994) 18 (8) Child Abuse & Neglect, 617-633; Wozencraft, T, Wagner, W, and Pellegrin, 
A, ‘Depression  and  suicidal  ideation  in  sexually  abused  children’, (1991) 15 Child Abuse & Neglect, 
505-511. 
26  Currie, J, and Widom, C, ‘Long-term consequences of child abuse and neglect on adult economic 
well-being’,  (2010) 15 Child Maltreatment, 111-120. 
27  Cutajar, M, Mullen, P, Ogloff, J, Thomas,  S,  Wells,  D,  and  Spataro,  J,  ‘Schizophrenia  and  Other  
Psychotic  Disorders  in  a  Cohort  of  Sexually  Abused  Children’,  (2010)  67  Arch Gen Psychiatry 1114-
1119. 
28 Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325; Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363; Stingel v Clark (2006) 228 ALR 
229; W v Eaton [2011] TASSC 4. 
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recognition and quantification of damage as a result of the wrongful acts, the plaintiff 
usually brings an action in negligence, rather than trespass.  
 
This may have consequences for the activation of different time limitations. Usually it 
is more beneficial for a plaintiff to proceed in negligence or breach of duty, than in 
trespass.29 Yet, even if proceeding in negligence, many plaintiffs will face major 
challenges meeting the time limit. 
 
Statutes of limitation applied to child sexual abuse cases 
For child abuse cases, the time limits within which a civil claim for compensation must 
be commenced vary between States, and can depend on the identity of the 
perpetrator. Traditionally, these statutes have allowed 3 years after turning 18 to bring 
the action. In some jurisdictions, this is still the case.  
 
Table 3: State and Territory legislation: limitation periods for civil claims based on sexual assault 
 
State/Territory Legislation  Standard limitation period If defendant is parent or 
close associate of a parent 
Australian Capital Territory Limitation Act 1985  3 years from majority ie age 21 
and  
3 years post-knowledge of 
‘disease  or  disorder’ 
No provision 
New South Wales Limitation Act 1969 Within 3 years of discoverability 
by parent, with a longstop of 12 
years 
For events post 6 December 
2002: time runs from age 25 
but other provisions mean 
plaintiff may have until age 37 
Northern Territory Limitation Act 1981 3 years from majority ie age 21 No provision 
Queensland Limitation of Actions 
Act 1974 
3 years from majority ie age 21 No provision 
South Australia Limitation of Actions 
Act 1936 
3 years from majority ie age 21 
and  
3 years post-knowledge of injury 
No provision 
Tasmania Limitation Act 1974 Standard: s 26(1) – 6 years from 
majority ie age 24 
 
For events post 1 January 2005: 
earlier of 3 years after 
discoverability or 12 years after 
event 
For events post 1 Jan 2005: 3 
years from turning 25 ie age 
28 
Victoria Limitation of Actions 
Act 1958 
Within 6 years of discoverability 
by parent, with a longstop of 12 
years 
For events post 21 May 2003: 
time runs from age 25 but 
other provisions mean 
plaintiff may have until age 37 
Western Australia Limitation Act 2005  If injured under age 15: 6 years; 
If over 15, by age 21 
For events post 15 Nov 2005: 
until age 25 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 This is because actions in trespass are actionable per se, that is, without proof of damage.  
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Reforms after the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence, recognizing that child abuse 
cases are different 
 
However, the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence in 2002 prompted some States to 
change their legislation.30 It recognised that cases where a child was injured by a 
parent or a ‘close associate’ of the child’s parent were a special class of cases. In the 
interests of justice, these cases required victims of abuse to be allowed more than the 
usual period of time to seek compensation in the courts, because of the nature of the 
acts, the nature of the context, and the nature of the injuries.  
 
It was highly significant that the Ipp Review recommended this, because its terms of 
reference were to examine methods to reform the law to limit liability and amounts of 
damages in civil proceedings. Even with this brief, the Ipp Panel evidently felt 
compelled to recognise that these types of child abuse cases required the modification 
of existing laws, not to limit liability, but to expand liability. 
 
Time limits for injury by a parent or close associate of a parent 
 
So, in New South Wales (for injuries sustained on or after 6 December 2002), and in 
Victoria (for injuries sustained on or after 21 May 2003), a person injured when he/she 
was a child by a parent or a ‘close associate’ of a parent has the limitation period on 
their legal action only begin to run from age 25, and other provisions operate so that 
in many of these cases, such plaintiffs will have until age 37 to bring their claim. 
 
The  inadequacy  of  the  ‘close  associate  of  a  parent’  provision 
 
A  ‘close  associate’  is defined as a person whose relationship with the parent or 
guardian is such that:  
(a) the parent/guardian might be influenced by the person not to bring an action on 
behalf of the victim; or  
(b) the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent/guardian the act resulting 
in the injury. 
 
Parliamentary debates in New South Wales indicate that the primary function of the 
special time limitation provision was to create an ‘important  exception’  for  cases  of  
child abuse.31 
 
Similar provisions have since been enacted in Western Australia and Tasmania, 
although these are not as generous as those in NSW and Victoria. In Tasmania, for 
injuries sustained on or after 1 January 2005 where the defendant is the child’s parent 
or in a ‘close relationship’ with the child’s parent, the plaintiff generally has 3 years 
from turning 25. In Western Australia, for actions arising after 15 November 2005, a 
person injured when a child by a parent or a  ‘person in a close relationship’ with the 
parent has until age 25 to bring an action. In contrast, other States have not modified 
                                                     
30 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence, Canberra, 2002 (the Ipp Report). 
31 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 November 2002 (Michael Egan, 
Treasurer, Minister of State Development and Vice-President of the Executive Council), at6896ff. 
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their legislation even after these recommendations and changes in other States. It is 
clearly inequitable and illogical that there are such significant differences between 
States. At a minimum, every State and Territory should have a similar approach for 
enabling plaintiffs to bring actions where the perpetrator is a parent or a close 
associate of a parent.  
 
However, there are other concerns regarding the scope of this provision and its 
suitability to deal with institutional and other child sexual abuse cases. 
 
The limited scope of the close associate provision means the reforms fall short of 
what is required 
 
These reforms will not satisfactorily accommodate claims arising from child sexual 
abuse, especially in institutional contexts. These changes have made the situation 
marginally better for victims of child sexual abuse in some States, in cases where the 
defendant  is  the  child’s  parent  or  is  deemed  to  be  a  ‘close  associate’  of  the parent.  
 
However, even these amended limits are still too narrow, as they only apply to 
selected subsets of cases. Furthermore, the definition  of  a  ‘close  associate’  does  not  
appropriately accommodate the context, dynamics and sequelae of child sexual abuse, 
or the reasons for nondisclosure.  
 
There are two reasons for this. First, under  the  first  limb,  a  ‘close  associate’  is  ‘a 
person whose relationship with the parent or guardian is such that:  
 
(a) the parent/guardian might be influenced by the person not to bring an action 
on behalf of the victim’. 
 
Yet, in cases of institutional abuse, and many of child sexual abuse generally, a 
parent’s  failure  to  bring  an  action  on  the  child’s  behalf  is  not  due  to  the  wrongdoer  
having this type of relationship with the  child’s  parent.  In many cases, there will be no 
relationship at all. Even where a relationship between parent and perpetrator does 
exist, the words of the provision indicate that there must be some influence brought 
to bear on the parent by the wrongdoer. Yet, such direct influence will rarely be 
present. 
 
Second, under the second limb, a  ‘close  associate’  is  ‘a person whose relationship 
with the parent or guardian is such that:  
 
(b) the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent/guardian the act resulting 
in the injury.’ 
 
Yet, in cases of institutional abuse, and many of child sexual abuse generally, the 
reason for nondisclosure by the child to the parent will not be because of the identity 
of the perpetrator and their relationship with the  child’s  parent. Rather, it is because 
of the nature of the acts,  the  child’s  feelings  about  them,  the  threats  or  inducements  
made to the child, and the whole psychological context of the abuse.   
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As stated in Mathews (2004):32 
 
Will the close associate provision be capable of including wrongdoers such 
as  priests,  teachers,  scoutmasters,  de  facto  partners  of  the  child’s  mother,  
grandparents, and sports coaches? In both limbs of the definition, the 
phrase  ‘might  be’  suggests  a  broad  ambit,  being  conceptually more 
inclusive  than  descriptors  such  as  ‘is’. Moreover, since this special limitation 
period is a remedial provision, it should be interpreted beneficially in the 
event of any ambiguity.33 Therefore, in the context of the second limb, it 
seems reasonable to argue that in cases where a child is unwilling to 
disclose  the  abuse  because  of  the  wrongdoer’s  identity  and  relationship  
with  the  child’s  parent,  or  because  of  an  unwillingness  to  disclose  the  abuse  
for some reason connected with the nature of the acts and the nature of 
any feelings produced by those acts, the victim should receive the benefit 
of the close associate special provision. [But] If construed only by 
reference to the identity of the wrongdoer, and if this construction 
negates the operation of the provision in cases where the child feels 
unwilling to disclose the acts because of the nature of them rather than 
because the child perceives a close relationship between the wrongdoer 
and his or her parent, the close associate provision could be framed too 
narrowly. 
 
 
 
3.6 Extension of time applications  
 
Most, but not all, statutes contain provisions under which a plaintiff is enabled to seek 
an extension of time, where she or he is prima facie out of time, and where the claim 
has been challenged by the defendant pleading the expiry of time. Even among those 
jurisdictions where extensions are possible, and while sometimes successful, such 
applications consume further cost and time, and may cause further psychological 
distress.  
 
There are differences between jurisdictions but in general, there are three major 
conditions which must be met by a plaintiff seeking an extension of time. First, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that they have recently discovered a  ‘material  fact’  of  a  
‘decisive  character’. This generally refers to one of the key discoverability criteria, such 
as the nature and extent of the injury, the connection of the abuse with the injury. 
 
Second, the plaintiff must not be judged to have failed to take reasonable steps to find 
out the material facts before they actually did. This has been the arguably flawed basis 
for many decisions not to extend time.34 It can be noted that some recent case law has 
                                                     
32 B  Mathews,  ‘Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury to a child by a parent or close 
associate:  new  jurisdictional  gulfs’  (2004)  12(3)  Torts Law Journal 239 at 247. 
33 Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370 at 384. 
34 See for example Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2000] 
QSC 306 (Unreported, White J, 8 September 2000); affirmed in [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, 
McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August 2001; Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021; 
Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting J, 21 June 2002). 
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offered hope for plaintiffs regarding the reasonable steps issue. Namely, in 
Queensland, it has been found that it is not reasonable to expect someone to have 
found out all the relevant facts if they would have been personally affected at that 
time by having to revisit the relevant events.35 Similarly, N v Queensland36 held that 
elements of a plaintiff’s  condition  that  make  her  or  him  afraid  to  discuss  her/his  
problems, and thus to avoid medical treatment, make the failure to ascertain the 
material facts not unreasonable. This finding was affirmed by the Queensland Court of 
Appeal in NF v Queensland37 where Keane JA stated that the relevant state of 
knowledge is that attainable not by an abstract reasonable person, but by the 
particular person who has suffered particular personal injuries [29-31]: 
 
Whether an applicant for an extension of time has taken all reasonable steps 
to find out a fact can only be answered by reference to what can reasonably 
be  expected  from  the  actual  person   in   the  circumstances  of   the  applicant…if 
that person has taken all the reasonable steps that she is able to take to find 
out the fact and has not found it out, that fact is not within her means of 
knowledge for   the  purpose  of   s   30(1)(c)…[Section]  30(1)(c)   is   not   concerned  
with what might reasonably be expected of a reasonable person; it is 
concerned with what might reasonably be expected of the applicant in the 
particular case. 
 
These findings hinge on a more sensitive understanding of the principle that the 
question of whether a person has taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the nature 
and extent of their injuries, must be answered by reference to what can reasonably be 
expected from the actual person in the circumstances of the plaintiff.38 
 
Court discretion – prejudice  to  defendant’s  right to a fair trial 
 
The third condition is frequently the fatal blow for those seeking access to a court to 
claim damages for historic child abuse. Often, this most problematic barrier for 
plaintiffs seeking extensions of time still remains, simply because of the effluxion of 
time.  
 
The court must exercise its discretion to allow the extension of time. The court will 
only  allow  the  extension  if  it  considers  the  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial  has  not  been  
unduly prejudiced. This does not mean there must be a complete absence of 
prejudice. These applications turn on their individual facts, and there are numerous 
                                                     
35 Wetherall v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2008] QSC 212. 
36 [2004] QSC 290. 
37 [2005] QCA 110. 
38 In  addition,  for  jurisdictions  having  provisions  similar  to  Queensland’s,  material  facts  will  only  attain  
the  status  of  having  a  ‘decisive  character’  when  it  is  found  to  be  timely  and  in  the  plaintiff’s  interests  
to bring an action. In Queensland v Stephenson (2006) 227 ALR 17, it was accepted that the plaintiff 
had knowledge of all the material facts before the relevant date. However, it was accepted by the 
court (in QCA and at first instance) - and by the defendant State of Queensland - that those facts, 
though constituting all material facts relating to the right of action, were not of a decisive character 
until after the critical date. One reason for this was that if the plaintiff had have commenced the 
action before the time he actually did, it would have exacerbated the applicant's psychiatric 
disability.  
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examples where applications have been denied. The key consideration is whether the 
defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial  has  been  unfairly  prejudiced  by the lapse of time. Such 
prejudice can be produced by, for example, the fading of memory, the death of or 
inability to locate witnesses, and the loss of other available evidence. 
 
Accordingly, if the court determines that the delay involved and its effect produces 
such significant prejudice to the defendant that a fair trial cannot be secured, then a 
plaintiff will be defeated in obtaining an extension of time in which to bring 
proceedings. Where there is a substantial period of time between the alleged events 
and the application for an extension, it will only be in unusual cases that a plaintiff will 
overcome this obstacle by the existence of sufficiently extensive documentary records, 
witnesses still alive who had reasonable memories of events, and the like.39 
 
In other cases, these sources of evidence will usually be unavailable. The shorter the 
delay, the more likely it is that a plaintiff may be able to overcome this requirement. 
There are cases where a plaintiff alleging child sexual abuse has obtained an extension 
of time.40 However, many suits have been defeated before reaching court on this 
basis. Applications for extensions of time consume significant financial and emotional 
resources, and take time. Unscrupulous defendants can draw out the litigious process 
in the hope of exhausting or impoverishing a vulnerable plaintiff. In those applications 
that do proceed to a decision, where a longer period of time has elapsed from the 
alleged events to the extension application, the likelihood of discretion being exercised 
in  the  plaintiff’s  favour  diminishes and the application will be refused.41 There are even 
cases where a defendant has been criminally convicted on a higher burden of proof, 
yet the subsequent application for a civil extension of time has still been denied.42 
 
 
3.7 Defendant must plead expiry of time 
 
An often overlooked feature of this context is that while the time limitation is set 
down in the legislation, a defendant must actively choose to plead the expiry of time 
to activate the time bar and defeat a plaintiff from having access to the civil justice 
system. Accordingly, the mere fact of the time period having expired does not 
automatically bar or defeat a claim. Institutions and government defendants often 
claim that they are bound by their insurers to rely on the expiry of time defence. 
However, this is not a convincing justification for forcing vulnerable plaintiffs into 
lengthy, costly and distressing legal proceedings where there is clear evidence of the 
relevant events and injuries having occurred. A defendant could choose to satisfy the 
                                                     
39 See for example N v State of Qld [2004] QSC 290 McMurdo J Sup Ct; upheld on appeal in NF v Qld 
[2005] QCA 110. 
40 See for example N v State of Qld [2004] QSC 290 McMurdo J Sup Ct; upheld on appeal in NF v Qld 
[2005] QCA 110 per Williams JA, and Keane JJA, with whom Holmes J agreed; Tusyn v Tasmania (No 
3) [2010] TASSC 55; VMT v Corp of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane and State of Queensland 
[2007] QSC 219; Rundle v Salvation Army [2007] NSWSC 443; upheld in Salvation Army v Rundle 
[2008] NSWCA 347.  
41 HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2009] QCA 168. 
42 MCA v State of Queensland [2011] QSC 298. 
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reasonable requests of a plaintiff from their own resources, or could in other ways 
accept the financial consequences of the injuries occasioned to children in their care.  
 
Governments should act as a model litigant in legal proceedings 
 
It is relevant that in many claims, the defendant is a government or one of its agencies. 
This is significant because when governments are involved in litigation as defendants, 
there is an axiom of public policy and an expectation that they will conduct themselves 
as a model litigant. Most significantly in this context, the model litigant principle 
requires governments to refuse to rely on legal technicalities in the face of compelling 
evidence of a sound claim by a plaintiff.  
 
The model litigant principle has long been recognized,43 and is reflected in policy 
statements by governments.44 It requires the State and its agencies when acting as a 
defendant in civil and criminal proceedings to act fairly, to settle claims which are 
legitimate without recourse to litigation, to resist reliance on its superior financial 
resources and access to legal advice to defeat plaintiffs, and not to plead legal 
technicalities when liability is not in dispute. 
 
In the context of civil claims for damages arising from child sexual abuse, there are 
numerous  cases  where  government  defendants  challenge  plaintiffs’  claims  on  the  
basis of expiry of time, despite apparently ample evidence of the facts constituting 
abuse and injury.45 This suggests the model litigant principle has not been consistently 
observed in these cases. 
 
  
3.8 Further pre-court procedures make the litigation process even 
more complex and costly 
 
Some jurisdictions (eg Queensland, ACT, South Australia) have enacted further pre-
court procedural requirements, which require additional steps to be taken in the 
commencement of civil claims, with these steps having their own time limits. An 
example is the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), which requires plaintiffs 
to lodge a notice of claim within nine months of the incident (or within nine months of 
the first appearance of symptoms of the injury if the injury is not immediately 
apparent), or within one month of seeking legal advice, whichever is the earlier.  
 
While it appears that in practice, failure to comply with these requirements can often 
be overcome, to do so requires further legal steps and court orders, which causes 
                                                     
43 See generally Melbourne Steamship Co Ltd v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333 at 342 (Griffith CJ); Morely 
v ASIC [2010] NSWCA 331; ASIC v Hellicar [2012] 2012 HCA 17. 
44 See for example Queensland Government, Model Litigant Principles, 2012, 
http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/corporate/model-litigant-principles 
45 See for example: Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 021; N v State of Qld [2004] QSC 290; NF v 
Queensland [2005] QCA 110; State of Qld v RAF [2010] QCA 332; Tusyn v Tasmania (No 3) [2010] TASSC 
55; MCA v State of Queensland [2011] QSC 298.  
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extra burdens in financial expense and emotional strain, as well as further delaying any 
civil proceedings themselves. These requirements are therefore a significant additional 
burden on plaintiffs in these cases. 
 
3.9 The State is not bound by time limits in criminal proceedings for 
child sexual assault claims 
 
It seems both illogical and unjust to impose a different and harsher requirement on an 
individual plaintiff bringing a civil claim for damage they have suffered, than exists for 
the State when brining a criminal prosecution of an offender for the same acts. Yet, 
this is the current situation.  
 
The State is not limited by time in prosecuting indictable criminal offences, which 
include the acts constituting child sexual abuse. The High Court has held that 
individuals accused of criminal acts have no right to a speedy trial, or even to trial 
within a reasonable time.46  
 
The fact that long delayed criminal prosecutions have been brought for child sexual 
abuse demonstrate that it is possible for a fair trial to be secured many years after the 
relevant events.47 The fact that this is so, even in the criminal context where the 
burden of proof is higher than in civil proceedings, endows this argument with even 
more cogency. 
 
As well, judges in criminal courts have accepted that many survivors of child sexual 
abuse, for good reasons, take a long time to report it, hence delaying the 
commencement of a criminal proceeding. In 1995, for example, Wilcox J stated:48 
 
It is commonplace for there to be a substantial delay in the reporting of alleged sexual 
assaults,  especially  where  the  complainant  is  a  child  …  [M]any  sexual  assault  victims  
are unable to voice their experience for a very long time. To adopt a rule that delay 
simpliciter justifies a stay of criminal proceedings would be to exclude many offences, 
particularly offences against children, from the sanctions of the criminal law. 
 
 
                                                     
46 Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23. It is recognised that delay may impede a 
fair trial and courts have occasionally stayed proceedings: see Gill v DPP (NSW) (1992) 64 A Crim R 
82; R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 152.  
47 See eg, R v Birdsall (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Criminal Appeal, Cole 
JA, Grove and Simpson JJ, 3 March 1997), involving acts allegedly committed between 1961 and 
1967, with the report occurring in 1995; R v Dodds [1996] QCA 402 (Unreported, Fitzgerald P, Pincus 
JA and Lee J, 18 October 1996), involving acts allegedly committed between 1984 and 1986, with 
proceedings instituted in 1994.  
48 R v Lane (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 19 June 1995) 2. See also R v Austin 
(1995)  14  WAR  484  (where  Owen  J  states:  ‘It  is  not  at  all  uncommon  for  there  to  be  a  delay  in  the  
institution  of  proceedings  for  sexual  offences’:  at  493);  R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 152. 
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Appendix 
A Model Limitation of Actions Act Provision  
This proposed model limitation provision for civil claims in relation to injuries suffered 
from sexual assault is based on the Canadian provisions (citations below). 
The first subsection removes the limitation period for claims based on sexual assaults. 
If a jurisdiction chose to adopt it, it would need to decide whether to apply the 
provision to child abuse, abuse of adults, or both. The second subsection, if a 
jurisdiction chose to adopt it, removes the limitation retrospectively so that any pre-
existing limitation period is voided for claims arising from events occurring prior to the 
enactment of the provision.  
No limitation period 
Section 7 
(1) Notwithstanding sections 3-6 [the provisions of the Act setting out other limitation 
periods], where misconduct of a sexual nature, including without limitation any kind of 
sexual assault, has been committed against a minor or person, and that minor or person 
was:  
             (a)  under the care or authority of; or 
             (b)  financially, emotionally, physically or otherwise dependent upon  
another person, organization or agency, there shall be no limitation period and an action 
arising from that sexual misconduct may be brought at any time. 
(2) Section 7(1)  applies  whether  or  not  the  person’s  right  to  bring  the  action  was  at  any  time  
governed by a limitation period. 
Table 1: Canadian provincial and territorial legislation: limitation periods for civil claims based on 
sexual assault 
 
Province/territory Legislative provision Effect 
Alberta Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12 Limitation period retained 
British Columbia Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13, s 3(1)(k) No limitation period 
Manitoba The Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM c L 150, s 2.1(2)(a) No limitation period 
New Brunswick Limitation of Actions Act, SNB, 2009, c L-8.5, s 14.1 No limitation period 
Newfoundland and Labrador Limitations Act, SNL 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2) No limitation period 
Northwest Territories Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1988, c L-8, s 2.1(2) No limitation period 
Nova Scotia Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5) No limitation period while 
plaintiff not aware of injuries 
and causal connection 
Ontario Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, s 10 No limitation period 
Prince Edward Island Statute of Limitations, RSPEI 1988, c S-7 Limitation period retained 
Quebec Civil Code of Quebec, LRQ, c C-1991, s 2926.1 30 years 
Saskatchewan The Limitation Act, SS 2004, c L-16.1, s 16(1)(a) No limitation period 
Yukon Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 139, s 2(3) No limitation period 
 
